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DEMOCRATIC DESPOTISM AND THE
INADEQUACY OF A REPRESENTATIONREINFORCING POINT OF VIEW
Gary C. Leedes*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutionalism implies canalized discretion, but does
not necessarily imply judicial review. Judicial review, however,
helps reduce the scope of unfettered official discretion. If most
political outcomes were immune from judicial review, the idea
of constitutionalism would not be carried out in practice when
officials abuse their discretion, or go beyond their limits of
power.
Occasionally democracy runs riot, notwithstanding freedom of speech, widespread suffrage, and adequate participation in government by racial and ethnic minorities. In such
cases, legal protection is illusory when courts of constitutional
law lack the will to mark the limits of the government's sovereignty. Judicially manageable standards that are suitable for
discerning arbitrary and irrational legislation should be developed and applied. Otherwise, the free people in a democracy
have inadequate protection against the despotism of their own
representatives.
II.

VESTED RIGHTS VERSUS THE POLICE POWER AND POSITIVE

LAW

Ordinary courts of law, in the early nineteenth century,
had power to mark the limits of legislative sovereignty, and
were relied upon to delineate the contours of an individual's
constitutionally protected rights. Courts protected fundamental rights, not because they were mentioned in the Constitution; but because they were fundamental, separate, and apart
© 1983 Gary C. Leedes
* Visiting Professor of Law; B.S., University of Pennsylvania Wharton School;
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from their enumeration within the Constitution.' E.C. Corwin
wrote, with reference to the vested rights doctrine: "The written constitution is . . . but a nucleus or core of a much wider
region of private rights, which . . . are as fully entitled to the

protection of government as if defined in the minutest detail." 2 The Supreme Court's substantive due process doctrine
in many respects is the modern equivalent of the earlier
vested rights doctrine. According to the vested rights doctrine,
in its strong form, the police power stops short of an enclave
of protected rights.
By 1830, the vested rights doctrine was no longer the
dominant theory of constitutional law. Its many qualifications
and exceptions proved to be its undoing. The case law precedent, which had earlier given the doctrine vitality and legitimacy, was undermined. The idea of natural rights, which had
originally justified the protection of individual rights, became
less convincing to more people.
The vested rights, most carefully protected by judges,
were property rights, but it became increasingly obvious that
restrictions on property are necessary to police a variety of
nuisances that interfere with the general welfare. When the
pertinent judicial question narrows to whether the legislature's goal is legitimate and its means reasonable, the vested
rights doctrine becomes a rational basis test, a deferential
level of judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, the police power remains limited in scope, and courts of law have properly fixed
"the outside border of reasonable legislative action, the
boundary beyond which the

power in general cannot

. . .

go." 3

police power, and legislative

"The ultimate arbitrator as

what is rational and permissible is . . . the courts, so far as

litigated cases bring the question before them."" If it were not
so, legislation, incompatible with the deepest presuppositions
of society, would be unreviewable.
Chief Justice Gibson doubting the courts' power of judicial review, wrote "that the people are wise, virtuous, and
competent to manage their own affairs." 5 The legal question,
1. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L.
REv. 247-48 (1914).
2. Id. at 248.
3. J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAys 27 (1927).
4. Id. at 32.
5. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 335 (Pa. 1825).
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however, is the authority of the people's representatives. Chief
Justice Gibson disagreed; since "sovereignty and legislative
power are . . .convertible terms, . . . it is [not] the business
of the judiciary, to . . . scan the authority of the lawgiver
.. ,"6Although Gibson's view was never fully accepted, the
vested rights doctrine declined in influence as the courts began to respect the scope of the police power.
Despite the declining influence of the vested rights doctrine in its original form, and the expanded scope of the police
power in the twentieth century, the great seventeenth and
eighteenth century notions of natural justice and liberty survive. Due process of law is presently a synonym for venerable
principles of justice and liberty, and as applied, it is also "a
synonym for the collective wisdom of civilized mankind
. .. .- This gossamer remnant of the ancient ideal of natural
law, is vague,' and vague principles of justice present at least
two problems: First, the abstractions do not provide specific
guidance when the pending case requires a practical choice
between two or more plausible alternatives; second, the judges
lack special insights into the collective wisdom of civilized
mankind. The opinion in the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 9
for example, did not display any unique sagacity on the part
of the Supreme Court. After Roe v. Wade, a controversial case
ruling, the stage was set for a theory of judicial review that
designated a new limit for judicial activism, one more confining than the "prevailing academic line."' 10
III.

THE ELYSIAN CHALLENGE TO CONVENTIONAL THEORY

The representation-reinforcing point of view propounded
by John Ely favors judicial intervention to correct political
process defects, yet Ely urges almost total judicial abstinence
when political outcomes are challenged by litigants relying
upon substantive due process principles." Justice Holmes, an
6.
7.

Id. at 348.
Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REv. 149, 365-409 (1928) (quoting F. POLLOCK, EXPANSION OF THE COMMON
LAW 137 (1904)).
8. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 51 (1980).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. J. ELY, supra note 8, at 43.
11. Id. at 180. There should be strict judicial scrutiny when the courts determine that "representative government cannot be trusted." Ely favors judicial intervention, not prudence, in the area of voting rights, freedom of speech and areas where
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earlier advocate of judicial restraint, once reminded Justice
Frankfurter, "A law should be called good if it reflects the will
of the dominant forces of the community even if it will take
us to hell."12 Ely's modern process-oriented theory of judicial

restraint is less hard-nosed: the road to hell must be paved
with good intentions, and it must have no procedural
roadblocks.
Ely brings forward certain premises of the framers to justify his thesis. As he describes his position along the spectrum
of scholarly thought:
[The representation-reinforcing approach] is . . . a position . . . capable of keeping faith with the document's
promise in a way ... that a clause-bound interpretivism

is not, and capable at the same time of avoiding the objections to a value-laden form of noninterpretivism, objections rooted most importantly in democratic theory...
and the relative institutional capabilities of legislatures
and courts ....

Is

Thus, according to Ely, "a representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its rival value-protecting approach, . . . is entirely supportive of the underlying premises

of the American system of representative democracy."" The
underlying premises-what Ely calls "Carolene Products
premises"15-are utilized to minimize the countermajoritarian
difficulty of having "Justices appointed for life permanently
thwarting the will of the people by striking down the work of
their elected representatives.""
The Carolene Products premises 1 7 are consistent with the
modern Court's position that economic regulation lies principally in the legislature's domain, and that economic legislation
the Court can ensure a "broadened access" to representative government. Id. at 74.
He favors a higher level of judicial scrutiny to protect the politically powerless minorities who are not benefiting from adequately responsive representative government.
Id. at 135-72.
12. M. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 65
(1982).
13. J. ELY, supra note 8, at 88-89.
14. Id. at 88.
15. Ely, Democracy and the Right to be Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397 (1981)
(reference to United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
16. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 487 (1982).
The phrase "countermajoritarian" is borrowed from Professor Wellington. See id.
17. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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ordinarily enjoys a powerful presumption of constitutionality.
Justice Stone, after noting that presumption of constitutionality might not hold with the same force when legislation appears to contravene specific prohibitions of the Constitution,
wrote:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation
. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities
. . : whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.18
This footnote, Professor Ely writes, can be seen as "a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judi'
cial review," 19
since it directs our attention to failures of process rather than to failures in substantive political outcomes
that violate individual rights and liberties.
A supporter of Ely's theory writes:
The representation-enforcing approach commands judicial intervention where the mechanisms of participatory
government have failed to operate, but it also requires
deference where no such defect appears. The failure to
defer to the legislative product undercuts the democratic
process in a multitude of ways. It permits substitution of
judicially imposed policies for evenhanded and rationally
based state legislative efforts. It encourages politically influential interest groups to seek remedies in judicial
rather than legislative tribunals. It induces congressional
20
and agency abrogation of responsibility.
Supporters of Ely's theory try to convey the impression that
18. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
19. J. ELY, supra note 8,at 87.
20. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 44243 (1982).
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voters have adequate influence, and that representative government is generally responsive to voters. Ely's critics, however, point out that his process-oriented theory ignores too
many social and economic inequalities. His critics also deplore
the significant political imbalances that make the very idea of
a well-functioning system of representational democracy a
delusion."1
The difference between Ely's thesis, and the process-oriented theories of previous generations is that Ely rejects a
consensus-focused conception of popular consent. 22 For the
most part, Ely assumes that a bare majority may take all and
that the Court should not determine whether the political
outcome is substantively fair. Since he believes the election
results reliably reflect the relevant consensus, Ely assumes
that "our political process works well enough as it is, and is
given [only] to rather discrete sorts of malfunction. ' '2 Not all
social and political scientists agree.
In terms of resources, skills and incentives, "citizens by
no means exert equal influence over their government."'2 ' Robert Dahl explains that
political weakness leads to continued political weakness
and strength to continued strength. Where a long history
of inequality creates a group with a few resources-wealth, income, status, education, official position-the prospects of successful political action are so
meager that incentives to act politically are low: as a consequence, political skills are not acquired. So the cycle
tends to be perpetuated.2
Thinkers who search for ideas to reconstruct the legal system
will be disappointed in Ely's theory, which encourages courts
to enter into the political thicket, but only part of the way.
The theory gets bogged down in what Daniel Boorstein called
"the thicket of unreality which stands between us and the
facts of life." 2 Not only the more progressive and radical
21. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future,42 OHIO ST. L.
J. 223, 242-46 (1981).
22. Id. at 231.
23. Id. at 240.
24. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 448 (3d ed. 1976).
25. Id. at 488.
26. Daniel J. Boorstein is quoted in THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1337 (1969).
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thinkers are disappointed, many conventional specialists in
constitutional law, like their intellectual role models, Justice
Frankfurter, Justice Harlan, and Professor Bickel, recognize
the need for courts to secure the first principles of liberty and
justice. This is not to say that Ely's thesis is not without many
supporters. Much support, however, is attributable to an overreaction to the poorly reasoned opinion in the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade. It is therefore necessary to compare the
concept of due process with the concept of representation in
order to discern their common ground: the reasonable expectations of the governed.
IV.

COMPARING THE MISCHIEVOUS CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND REPRESENTATION

Due process of law is a legal concept with political ramifications, and representation is a political concept with legal
ramifications. Both vague concepts are mischievous since they
can be used by over zealous advocates to justify worrisome
abuses of power. The two concepts are not necessarily in tension with each other; and indeed the two concepts interact
harmoniously when a political system, responsive to society's
demands, is functioning satisfactorily. Ideally, the concept of
due process of law preserves established rights in order to protect reasonable expectations; therefore, representatives are obligated to protect their constituents' rights and their reasonable expectations.
Constitutional violations occur when representatives
breach their duty to provide due process of law. Under these
circumstances, it would seem that adequate representation is
a secondary issue because a violation of due process is inadequate representation. The situation is somewhat more complicated than a syllogism, however, because the due process
clauses are evocative.
All specialists in constitutional law agree that the concept
of due process is constantly in need of clarification. Justice
Matthews stated that law "in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves [principles] of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law."2 This
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884) (California statute which
permitted criminal proceedings to be instituted by information was upheld on the
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conception of the general public good harkens back to John
Marshall and Alexander Hamilton "who were responsible for
developing a Rousseauan conception of the general will."'2

9

In

Peck,3 0

Fletcher v.
for example, Marshall relied upon the
"general principles"'" of society to reinforce his interpretation
of the contract clause. 2 Subsequently, the Court occasionally
used the ex post facto and bill of attainder prohibitions33 "to
do service for the latter-day concept of due process." '
Justice Frankfurter ably expounded the latter-day version of the concept of due process in Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.3 5 He wrote:
The requirement of "due process" is not ... a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate
analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just
treatment which has been evolved through centuries of
Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization,
"due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, "due
process" is compounded of history, reason, the past
course of decisions, and stout confidence in the democratic faith which we possess. Due process is not a
mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.3 6
With those eloquent phrases in mind, one understands why
the due process clause has acquired an independent potency
basis of its conformity with the principles of liberty and justice).
29. B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 244 (1967).
30. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 48 (1810).
31. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 42.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
34. B. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 84. Wright explains that in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333

(1867), the Court set aside "state and federal statutes requiring a highly inclusive
oath of nonsupport of the late wicked Rebellion as a prerequisite to the practice of
certain professions.
...
B. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 83. The basis of the Court's
holdings were the ex post facto and bill of attainder provisions of the Constitution.
§§ 9, 10.
341 U.S. 123 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 162-63.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

35.
36.

1983]

DEMOCRATIC DESPOTISM

that is neither confined nor comprehended by the more specific provisions in the Constitution. The need for a flexible
standard, yet one that provides guidance, was satisfied by Justice Harlan who wrote:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by any code. The best that can
be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions
it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon the postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society . . . . No formula could serve as a
substitute . . . for judgment and restraint.87
Though lacking a formula, according to Justice Harlan,
the Court considers the following factors:
[T]he nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, the existence
of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the
degree of confidence we may have that the statute reflects
the legislative concern for the purpose that would legitimately support the means chosen.8
Thus, the Supreme Court's flexible due process standard was
given structure by Justice Harlan; his methodology, however,
does not give the courts freewheeling authority to circumscribe the choices of representatives.
Justice Harlan's methodology is both too liberating in
some areas, and too confining in others for the process-oriented. Elysians claim that the balance our nation has struck
between individual liberties and the demands of organized society is a political balance. Judges are not trustworthy or competent enough to strike the political balance. Why, then, are
judges competent enough to use the premises of a representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review to correct the political dysfunctions of our democratic system?
This concept, representation, that is being reinforced by
the Elysians is no more and no less susceptible to principled
elaboration than due process of law. Representation is a concept that initially was not "linked with elections or democ37.
38.
result).

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
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racy, nor was [it] considered a matter of right."3 9 It is a concept, developed for the most part by politicians and
propagandists,' ° and, like the substantive due process concept
of liberty, it is a "loose concept, often used in various ways""'
by different advocates, "each of whom tends to claim that the
meaning he attributes to it is the only proper meaning."' 2
Political scientists, after examining several types of normative political theory, have concluded that "none of the
traditional formulations of representation are relevant to the
solution of the representational problems which the modern
day polity faces."' 8 Dean Ely, however, insists that judges may
actively enforce a somewhat Burkean conception of virtual
representation, called "equal concern and respect,"" which
by
justifies judicial activism with respect to "the process
45
which the laws that govern the society are made.'
Ely who criticizes the indeterminancy of the due process
clauses, advances a "purity of the process" argument that "is
indeterminate to the point of virtual uselessness. ' '1" Ely himself candidly admits that his starting premises "could be elaborated in various ways, '4 and that they do "not exhaust the
set of appropriate constitutional premises for our courts
I have noted elsewhere that Elysian theory, no less
than the Court's substantive due process doctrine, authorizes
judges to articulate political values that lack support in constitutional text and history.'9 In this section, however, I will
discuss the unduly deferential component of Ely's representation-reinforcing point of view.
The deferential component is based on a utilitarian /ecH. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 3 (1972).
A. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 124 (1971).
Id.
Id.
43. Id. at 101. (quoting H. EULAU, CHANGING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATION, reprinted in MICRO-MACRO POLITICAL ANALYSIS 77 (1969)).
44. J. ELY, supra note 8, at 98.
45. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
46. Ely, supra note 15, at 397.
47. Id. at 398.
48. Id.
49. Leedes, Book Review, 59 N.C.L. REV. 628 (1981) (reviewing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)); Leedes, The Supreme
Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1421-37 (1979).
50. J. ELY, supra note 8, at 187 n.14 (citing Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:
Its Allure And Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 405-08 (1978)).
39.
40.
41.
42.
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onomic model since it is designed to count the preferences of
voters according to a one person, one vote formula of apportionment. The courts keep their hands off of political outcomes, which are compatible, theoretically, with democracy's
underlying assumptions. To carry the economic analogy further, representative democracy is "regarded as a sort of economic marketplace in which votes constitute money, and
would-be representatives are competitively trying to sell
themselves to buyers."" Voters, however, do not decide the
issues; they choose the representatives who do, and assuming
there are no process defects, the only remedy an individual
has, when the political check fails, is to use "the ballot" once
again in hope of a new and better deal.
Ely's model is unresponsive if not insensitive to some basic values of human dignity, which should command elevated
levels of judicial scrutiny in order to protect individual rights.
The individual voter in Ely's utilitarian/economic model is
represented only in a formal sense and, acting alone, is powerless to undo the irrationality and inefficiency of various voting
outcomes that perpetuate inadequate and unresponsive
representation.
In contrast, Hanna Pitkin writes that "a representative
government is one . . .responsive to popular wishes" 2 when
"there [are] institutional arrangements for responsiveness to
those wishes." 3 She recognizes that "institutions develop a
momentum. . . of their own; they do not always work as intended . . . ." She concludes that "it is incompatible with
the idea of representation for the government to frustrate or
resist the people's will without a good reason,"5 5 or "to frustrate or resist it systematically over a long period of time."'
The representation-reinforcing point of view, however, condones the opposite conclusion, absent process defects, and
therefore, it is incompatible with Pitkin's vision of substantive
representation, which applies to all forms of government
whether democratic or not.
The difference between the Elysian and the Pitkin ap51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

H. PITKIN, supra note 39, at 291 n.35.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 233.
Id.
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proaches is that the latter "has both substantive and formal
components."6' Even Edmund Burke recognized that representation is a concept that "has substantive content." ' Obviously, if institutions do not respond to the grievances of the
represented, virtual representation "becomes an empty formality."' It is, therefore, difficult to see the representationreinforcing nature of a theory that denies the individual
meaningful access to courts when the government has violated
first principles of justice and liberty.
Some theorists stress the formal aspects of representation, that is, its "outward performance," 60 and others stress
the desired substantive behavior expected of representatives.
This is an understandable dichotomy in political science,
given the different views of the behaviorists and the normative theorists. Constitutional law, however, deals with behavior, norms, and the grievances of litigants; therefore, a theory
of constitutional law is incomplete unless it contains both formal and substantive ingredients.
A theory of constitutional law that counsels deference to
legislatures should not totally ignore-out of habit, resignation, or the lack of a disciplined but creative imagination-the
potential injustice of a, system of representation. There are
not any understandings among the people in the United
States which require courts to accept political outcomes that
are demonstrably violative of an individual's reasonable expectations. Although the representation-reinforcing point of
view embraces the venerable doctrine of legislative sovereignty, the historic dualism in the United States between individual rights and legislative sovereignty, inevitably in constant
tension, was not and could not be eliminated by the Court's
Carolene Products footnote. 2 The warrant for Dean Ely's abject surrender of the individual to the political process is
hardly implicit in Justice Stone's concise statement63 about
the need for judicial activism in extraordinary situations.
"[Plermanent reconciliation between the principles of
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 175-76.

60. Id. at 238.
61. Id.
62.
63.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
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representative government and the opposing principle of judicial authority""' is not to be found in Justice Stone's jurisprudence. 5 Elysian theory attempts to resolve Stone's dilemma
about double standards" by creating a different double standard that subordinates judicial activism in substantive due
process cases. Justice Stone, however, did not measure the
stature of American constitutional law "by the number of judicial restraints or by the height of the statutory mortality
rate. ' 67 He recognized that the value of the Constitution will
be judged by history on the basis of its strength and responsiveness to the needs of both the society and the individual.6 8
That ever present political dualism cannot be eliminated by a
footnote. When he published his Carolene Products opinion,
Justice Stone was concerned with the plight of the discrete
and insular minorities unable to bring their power to bear because of restrictions that hampered their political freedom. He
was also concerned with the unresponsiveness of legislatures
to these groups," but he did not attempt in a footnote "to
map the entire area of judicial hegemony. 7' 0
The footnote, at the behest of Chief Justice Hughes, indicated that there is a more exacting scrutiny "of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the fourteenth."' 7 1 Clearly, Chief Justice
Hughes was concerned with "the nature of the [constitutional]
right. 17 2 He sent a note to that effect to Justice Stone,7 3 who
64.

R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY vi (1941).
65. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW passim (1956).
66. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 108-12 (1975). (discussion of the footnote's genesis and double standards). See also Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the
Judicial Function, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 698 (1946). Judge Hand mistakenly presumed
that Stone shared his views, just as Mason assumed Stone shared his views on civil
liberties. Stone was somewhere in between, but less process-oriented than Ely.
67. The phrase "statutory mortality rate" is borrowed. See B. WRIGHT, supra
note 29, at 259.
68. Id. Wright is referring to James Madison's conception of the Constitution,
wherein the Constitution is flexible and adaptable but not flabby.
69. Other indications of Justice, then Chief Justice, Stone's interest in the political check of adequate representation are found in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S.
405 (1938); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184
n.2 (1938).
70. L. LUSKY, supra note 66, at 109.
71. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added).
72. A. MASON, supra note 65, at 513 (quoting letter from Charles Evans Hughes
to Harlan Fiske Stone (April 19, 1938)).
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replied, "I wish to avoid the possibility of having what I have
written in the body of the opinion about the presumption of
constitutionality in the ordinary run-of-the-mill due process
cases applied as a matter of course to ... other more exceptional cases."'" Justice Stone later indicated that he accepted
Justice Cardozo's formulation of the due process standard
which referred to "those 'fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.' ",75 Justice Cardozo and apparently Justice Stone
exist if [certain
believed "neither liberty nor justice would
' 71
sacrificed.
were
substantive guarantees]
Further evidence of Justice Stone's acceptance of Justice
Cardozo's formulation of the due process of law standard is
his concurring opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.7 7 Justice Stone wrote that the Oklahoma statute,
which authorized sterilization of a thief, had violated "the
first principles of due process, "78 since there was no evidence
that a thief's "criminal tendencies are of an inheritable
type. ' 79 Justice Stone, then Chief Justice, added, "There are
limits to the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person
73. Id. at 514 (quoting reply letter, Harlan Fiske Stone to Charles Evans
Hughes (April 19, 1938)).
74. Id.
75. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). For quotations from Stone's
letters indicating his approval, see A. MASON, supra note 65, at 516.
Justice Cardozo actually phrased the determinative question in due process cases
in a number of ways:
[Wihether the procedure in issue was "of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty"; whether to employ it violated a "principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental"; whether a "fair and enlightened system of justice
would be impossible without [it]"; whether "liberty and justice" would
exist if it were sacrificed; whether its use subjects a person to "a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity [would] not endure it";
whether it is among "those immutable principles of justice, acknowledged semper ubique et ab ominibus . . .wherever the good life is a
subject of concern."
See Kadish, Methodology and CriteriaIn Due Process Adjudication: A Survey and

Criticism, in

SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

522, 528 (1963). Professor

Kadish was quoting from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Kadish refers to these formulations as examples of
"flexible-natural law due process." Id.
76. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 326.
77. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
78. Id. at 545.
79. Id. at 544.
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is concerned." 80
Skinner was an extraordinary due process case in that it
differed from the kinds of cases identified in the Carolene
Products footnote. The Court's level of scrutiny, depending on
the case, has ranged from no scrutiny at all to a completely
independent judgment. As J. B. Thayer wrote:
The laying down of some rule of administration is legitimate, for ...

all courts, in regulating the exercise of their

functions, lay down, from time to time, rules of presumption and rules of administration. It is a usual, legitimate,
and necessary practice. It is, to be sure, judicial legislation; but it is impossible to exercise the judicial function
without such incidental legislation."1
The Court, Chief Justice Stone knew, adjusts its level of scrutiny for special policy reasons in civil liberties cases involving
both process values and substantive rights. Chief Justice
Stone's concurring opinion in Skinner demonstrates that his
footnote was intended (to use Robert McCloskey's figure) to
protect Peter, without abandoning Paul.82 More specifically
his Skinner opinion indicates that he did not approve of legislation which condemns, without hearing, "all the individuals
of a class to so harsh a measure
many merit condemnation . ... .

because some or even
Thus Chief Justice Stone

. . .

recognized that the concept of due process of law is concerned
with individuals-even if the legislature treats many
alike-when the nature of the wrong perpetrated by officials
puts the government's civilized decency on trial.
Elysian preoccupation with politically powerless classes
neglects the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which protects all "persons,

' 84

including the individual "who

belongs to no identifiable group at all."8 " The isolated individual can be "about as impotent a minority as can be
imagined, ' '8 and to think that groups behave like individuals
80. Id.
81. J. THAYER, supra note 3, at 150.
82.

See McClosky, Economic Due Process and The Supreme Court: An Exhu-

mation and Reburial, in

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 172 (Kurland ed. 1965).

83. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (Stone, J.,
concurring).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85. McCloskey, supra note 82, at 174.
86. Id.
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or feel like individuals is to confuse abstractions with life.

A political scientist writes, "If [group] interests are to be

given equal representation, the individuals must be denied
'
equal representation. There is no way out of this dilemma, "88
except by giving each individual access to a responsive court,
which has power to accommodate competing interests by giving due respect to each litigant, regardless of his membership
89
or lack of membership in a particular suspect class. Roscoe
Pound wrote:
[Tihe liberty guaranteed by our bills of rights is a reservation to the individual of certain fundamental reasonable expectations involved in life in civilized society and a
freedom from arbitary and unreasonable exercise of the
power and authority of those who are designated or chosen in a politically organized society to adjust relations
and order conduct, and so are able to apply the force of
the society to individuals. 0

There will inevitably be disputes about the enclaves of an individual's liberty, its boundaries, its exceptions, its constitutional significance and weight-disputes that will be resolved

"by the courts in ordinary proceedings at the suit of the persons aggrieved." 91 Contrary to a theory of process values, however, the individual's constitutional protection is not diminished when a majority violates his right to due process of law,
simply because the individual had an equal right to participate in the political process.
Not every human desire for gratification can be satisfied
by the Constitution, nor should it be. There are, however,
some rights that human beings have qua human beings. To
put the matter in its crudest terms, there is a distinction be92
tween human and animal experience. To be sure, this distinction implies there are human rights, not all of which are
87.

For the same thought, see C. CURTIS,

JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE

253

(1947).
88. R. DAHL, supra note 24, at 184.
89. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289, 297-99,
305, 318 n.52, 320 (1978) (Powell, J., opinion of the Court).
90. R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF LIBERTY 1
(1957) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 8.
92. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, in SELECTED ESSAYS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ETY 203 (1950)).

462 (1963) (quoting C.

SIEPMANN, RADIO, TELEVISION AND SoCI-
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guaranteed explicitly by the Constitution. Some of these basic
moral rights, however, can be affirmed by plausible interpretations of the text, which focus on the deepest presuppositions
of our society. The first amendment rights to read or write
about ideas, for example, is a moral right protected by the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. It is, however,
the substantive due process dimension of the Constitution
that protects "a man's right to read, write, or preach for reasons that go beyond the value of public debate in insuring
wise or fair legislation." 3
The absorption by the fourteenth amendment of substantive first amendment values is not a mechanical incorporation
of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the selective incorporation of
rights is not based on a theory that focuses solely upon the
participational aspects of representation. The Court's focus is
partly upon enduring basic values, which respect the isolated
human being who seeks access to the courts.
A judge does not need any special legal talent to recognize when a person is being treated as a non-person by the
government. This kind of common sense judgment, however,
is said to present a problem for the judicial process: "Legal
judgment loses its oracular force, and the jurists are robbed of
their most visible claim to expertise. '94 But if there is infliction of serious harm judges have authority to determine
whether legislation excessively ignores material differences
among individuals who have reasonable expectations of more
humane treatment.
It is claimed that judicial intervention will "encourage politically influential pressure groups to seek remedies in judicial
rather than legislative tribunals." 9 If the reasonable expectations of individuals are demonstrably frustrated by governmental officials, influential groups should file class actions
seeking court orders, since the legislature presumably has
failed to respond to the class members' just claims before the
commencement of litigation. It is said that judicially imposed
policies will be substituted for "evenhanded and rationally
based state legislative efforts." ' When, however, an even93.
94.

C.
P.

95.
96.

Eule, supra note 20, at 425, 442.
Id.

FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 109 (1978).
NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 83 (1978).
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handed and rational legislative effort crudely violates certain
basic expectations concerning civic virtue, there should be an
invalidation of the law; democratic government has no more
power to be inhumane than a totalitarian government.
Judicial review dilutes the apparent importance of a representative's obligation97 to his constituents. A court, nevertheless, has a duty to redress legitimate grievances after an
official body violates its constitutional obligation to aggrieved
constituents. Finally, it is claimed that judicial review will
lead to more governmental abuses requiring more judicial intervention and so on ad infinitum and ad nauseum; but, justified judicial intervention is a saner option than condoning a
serious violation of the individual's reasonable expectation of
civilized treatment.
Hard cases arise from the fact that we have a representative government, and admittedly judges often abuse their
power. Alexander Hamilton replied to this concern. He wrote
in the The Federalist,"The possibility of particular mischiefs
can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs, and to obtain general advantages." 8 In short,
judicial restraint is ordinarily appropriate, indeed preferable,
but since excessive judicial restraint gives the government an
undeserved, unfair advantage, undue deference can be a misuse of power."
Representative government can degenerate into an organized form of despotism, contrary to the Constitution's system
of checks and balances. The Elysian objection that judicial intervention will interfere with "the democratic process in a
multitude of ways"' 100 is a telling admission that an institutionalized system of checks and balances substantially influences political behavior in a democracy. The power of judicial
review inhibits outrageous behavior by electorally accountable
officials, who know court's provide effective relief for the system's victims.
Constitutional rules that require due process of law are
worthless when, as Madison argued, they are "not buttressed
by institutionalized structures of real power related to social
97.

Id. at 442, 443.

98.

THE FEDERALIST No.

99.

80, at 522. (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.).

100. Eule, supra note 20, at 442.
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reality.
... 101 Madison, although "wrong in detail about the
way in which the institutions of the new government work
• . . was right in the long run about the importance of channeling political activity in certain directions. '"101 Ely who asserts "that the . . . original Constitution is devoted almost entirely to structure,"1 0 3 misses Madison's point that the basic
skeletal structure was designed to contain the social forces
that violate the basic law of the land.
Ely notes that the Constitution was not dedicated "to the
identification and preservation of specific substantive values."10 4 Before its ratification, the absence of a complete list
of specific rights concerned many of the Constitution's opponents. Hamilton, however, explained that "a minute detail of
particular rights" ' is applicable only to a constitution that is
designed to regulate "every species of personal and private
concerns."100 The United States Constitution, Hamilton
pointed out, is not such a document.107 He also wrote, "It is
not. . . to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to
enable the representatives of the people to substitute their
will to that of their constituents. ' 10 8 Thus, the need exists for
the Court to adopt a methodology that keeps the legislature
"within the limits assigned to their authority."10 9
While "it is an awesome thing to strike down an act of
the legislature," the power is there to be used "where the occasion is clear beyond fair debate."1 1 0 Constitutional guarantees are not guarantees on paper only so long as courts armed
with credible opinions are empowered to declare what government action constitutes a majority's unlawful oppression of
innocent individuals. If judicial review were limited to participational rights, an individual's freedom might be a matter
of the expediency of group interaction, the casual outcome of
whatever pleases the dominant forces in the legislature at a
101. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 306 (reprinted 1969).
102. Id.
103. J. ELY, supra note 8, at 90.
104. Id. at 92.
105. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 559 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
109. Id.
110. R. JACKSON, supra note 64, at 323.
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particular time."' The Elysians, however, are right about one
point: a limit on the people's representatives is countermajoritarian. This is the essence of constitutionalism. The constraints imposed by constitutionalism "place a limit on su' 2
preme political authority without denying its existence.""
We do not have any maxim that the people or the people's
representatives are above the basic law.
The idea that certain individual rights are guaranteed
against the majority's will is disconcerting to those who claim
democracy is like a monarch above the law. But, however excruciatingly difficult it is to identify society's reasonable expectations of due process of law, "[t]he concept of liberty in
the Fourteenth Amendment is hardly adequate if it is limited
to the specific substantive guarantees of the first eight
Amendments and to procedural guarantees."'' 3 In short, despite the apparent incongruity of judicial review in a political
democracy, the concept of due process of law reinforces a person's rights to the minimum essentials of substantive representation and fundamental fairness.
V.

DEMOCRATIC DESPOTISM

Isaiah Berlin writes, "The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my
life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that of a free
area for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a
desire for the same thing.""" Indeed, when majorities unduly
constrict an individual's free area for action, democracy is "at
times, no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyranny.""15 By tyranny, Berlin refers to coerced "service to
human masters.""'
Tyranny in a political democracy, however, is not conceived as such by those whose creed apparently is that the
"law cannot be a tyrant."'"1 7 Benjamin Constant, who saw the
111. See generally M. VILE, supra note 102 at 294-314 (discussion of political
theory, constitutionalism, and the behavioral approach).
112. Schochet, Introduction: Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of
Politics, 20 NoMos 1, 11 (1979).
113. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties in SELECTED ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 461 (1963).
114. I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (1970).

115. Id.
116. Id. at 162.
117. Id.
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irony in the Elysian viewpoint, queried "why a man should
deeply care whether he is crushed by a popular government or
by a monarch, or even by a set of oppressive laws."' 8 "The
triumph of despotism is to force the slaves to declare themselves free."1 1 9 Elysian theory defends participatory self-government as a system that, on the whole, can provide adequate
guarantees against tyranny; but, at the same time, the theory
undervalues the connection between representation and oppressive laws. This attitude is difficult to reconcile with the
liberal tradition of civic virtue, according to which:
no society is free unless it is governed by ... two interrelated principles: first, that no power, but only rights, can
be regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever power
governs them, have absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanely; and, second, that there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable,
these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and
widely accepted that their observance has entered into
the very conception of what it is to be a normal human
being, and therefore, also of what it is to act inhumanely
or insanely .. .
This liberal notion describes a substantive dimension of freedom, but the existence of this area of freedom depends partly
on the strength of legally effective barriers that block a representative government's intrusion into the protected enclave.
Democracy can become either an organized anarchy, or a
Kafkaesque bureaucratic nightmare. The theorists who depend on process values to prevent political malfunctions are
depending on the effectiveness of public opinion to protect
the enduring values that are traditionally protected by most
American legislatures. Excited public opinion, however, can
viciously impinge on traditionally protected substantive liberties. Demagogic representatives can do much damage before
the public's sanity is restored. A political outcome, it follows,
can be the antithesis of the ideas of fundamental fairness and
civic virtue. Ely's thesis is therefore troubling to the libertarian, the humanist, and the constitutionalist because process
values do not cope adequately with the problem of democratic
118. Id. at 163.
119.
120.

Id. at 165.
Id.
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despotism.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ultimate end of individuals in a free society is the
improvement of their welfare, individually and collectively.
Accordingly, individuals owe each other civic duties. Civic duties engender expectations, and entail reciprocal rights. Transient majorities, however, do not always respect the reasonable expectations of all segments of the electorate in a
democracy.
Courts of constitutional law limit the power of elected
representatives. For the individual who has no other place to
go when democratic government malfunctions, the countermajoritarian concept of due process of law has evolved. Accordingly, despotic laws can be invalidated. Judicial review, if effective, is a means to prevent politics from running riot. Those
who object to the concept of substantive due process, because
of the underlying assumptions of democracy, would do well to
remember that democracy is not the ultimate end of a free
people. It is a system for working out, under law, a reasonable,
socially acceptable relationship between the interests of each
individual and his or her community's welfare.

